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2John Pippenger*
The theory ofPurchasing Power Parity was the first well-developed
theory of exchange rate determination. Although the efficient market
approach is an important theoretical advance over the conventional
arbitrage interpretation ofpurchasing powerparity, many ofthe empiri-
cal implications ofthe two approaches are similar. As a result, at this
time, the empirical evidence supports both views.
The adoption of more flexible exchange rates in
the early 1970s spurred both theoretical and empiri-
cal research on purchasing power parity (PPP). The
theoretical work refined existing ideas about the
theory and led to a new version of PPP based on
efficient commodity markets. The empirical
research created an impressive body of evidence.
This article reviews the theory behind two major
approaches to purchasing power parity, the arbitrage
and efficient markets approaches, and discusses the
evidence relevant to each.
The arbitrage approach is discussed first. In
spite of a widespread belief that arbitrage has
failed, particularly during the current float, the
evidence provides substantial support for an
arbitrage interpretation ofpurchasing power par-
ity. The efficient commodity market approach to
purchasing power parity initially proposed by
Richard Roll (1979) is the newest version ofPPP,
and it is discussed more thoroughly. Although the
efficientmarketapproach is an importanttheoreti-
cal advance over the conventional arbitrage inter-
pretation ofpurchasing power parity, many ofthe
empirical implications ofthe two approaches are
similar. As a result, at this time, the empirical
evidence supports both views.
I. Arbitrage
Theory
The arbitrage version ofpurchasing power par-
ity was the first well-developed theory of the
determination of exchange rates. Although the
roots of the theory go back at least to the period
whengoldfrom the New World began to influence
prices in Europe, Gustav Cassel (1916) is gener-
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ally credited with the first formal statementofthe
theory. The name, purchasing powerparity, comes
from Cassel's basic idea that exchange rates
should, in time, adjust so that a given amount of
currency buys the same bundle of goods in all
countries. In other words, exchange rates tend to
settle at the point where the purchasing powerofa
currency is the same, orat parity, in all countries. l
As an example, startwith asinglecommodity. It
might be a quart of milk, a Sony Walkman®, a
gallon of gasoline or a bushel of number 2 red
wheat. Ignoring information and transaction
costs, with effective arbitrage, the cost ofbuyingEquation I describes absolute purchasing
power parity. That is, it describes the relation
between the level of exchange rates and relative
price levels. This version of the theory is not
widely used for at least three reasons. First, in
spiteofrelatively little research, there is a general
consensus that it is not very accurate. Second,
while price indices are easy to find for almost all
countries, informationaboutthe priceofidentical
the good in the United States at time t, p(R,t),
should equal the costofthe good in Great Britain
at time t, p(F,t), converted to dollars using the
dollar price of the pound at time t, Set). That is,
p(R,t) should equal S(t)p(F,t). This is commonly
referred to as the law ofone price. The law ofone
price implies that the domestic price of foreign
exchange Set) equals the domestic price of the
product p(H,t) divided by the foreign price p(F,t).
If the product were wheat and the countries the
United States and Great Britain, then the dollar
price of pound sterling should equal the dollar
price of wheat divided by the pound price of
wheat.
The arbitrage interpretation of purchasing
power parity rests on a weaker version ofthe law
ofone pricethatdoes notrequire zero information
and transaction costs. For some goods, p(H,t)
may be less thanS(t)p(F,t). For actual orpotential
exportsby the UnitedStates, the pricedifferential
would reflect the information and transaction
costs associated with shipping goods to Great
Britain. Foractualorpotentialimports, theexcess
ofp(H,t) overS(t)p(F,t)reflects thecostofmoving
the goods from the U.K. to the U.S. lfthe infor-
mation and transactioncosts are roughly the same
in both directions, then the price in the U.S. ofa
broadly based bundle of goods, P(H,t), should
tend to equal the price ofthat bundle in the U.K. ,
P(F,t), converted into dollars at the going
exchange rate, Set). If there are goods for which
the information and transaction costs exclude any
possibilityofinternationaltrade, thenthis version
of PPP implicitly assumes that there is no sys-
tematic difference in their relative prices between
any two countries.
Mostempirical research on PPP involves regress-
ing the log ofthe ratio ofexchange rates on the log
ofa ratio of price indices:
In(s) = ex + 131n (:*) + z (4)
where z is an errorterm; In(x) is the natural log ofx;
S equals S(t)/S(O); P is a domestic price index; p* a
foreign price index; and the price indexes usually
are consumer or wholesale indexes, or GNP defla-
tors not based on identical bundles of goods. 3 The
usual interpretation ofequation 4 is that it supports
PPPwhenestimatesofex are notdifferent from zero,
estimates of 13 are not significantly different from






The right hand side of this equation can be
rearranged into a more familiar form - a ratio of
priceindices. Witha little manipulation, the right
hand side of equation 2 becomes [P(R,t)/
P(R,O)]/[P(F,t)/P(F,O)]. The numerator of this
ratio is simply a price index for the United States,
pH, and the denominator a price index for the
foreign country, PF. Both indices have the same
base period and use identical weights. Equation 3
uses these price indices to describe the relative
version ofpurchasing power parity. 2
Set) pH
S(o) = pF
bundlesofgoods in different countries is difficult
to locate. Third, for many purposes, it is the
changeinexchange rates that is important, not the
level.
Forthesereasons, almost all empirical work on
PPPhas concentratedontherelativeversionofthe
theory, which explains changes in the exchange
rate. Let Sea) be the exchange rate in some base
period, andP(H,O) and P(F,O) bethe domestic and
foreign priceofthe broadlybased bundleofgoods
in the base period. The relative version of PPP
says that the change in the exchange rate from the
base period°to some later period t equals the
relative change in the price ofthe bundleofgoods
in the two countries.
(1) Set) _ P(R,t)
- P(F,t)
32provides some examples of how regressions can
be misinterpreted.
As inflationary shocks dominate measurement
error, estimates of B and the R2 approach unity.
But as monetary shocks decline relative to the
measurementerror, R2declinesandestimatesofB
approach zero even though PPP in the form of
equation 3 holds exactly regardless ofthe relative
Different Weights
From an arbitrage point ofview, the weights in
price indices must be the same. Using consumer
or wholesale indices or GNP deflators violates
this requirement. The following example illus-
trates the problem. Suppose the United States
produces only wheat and Great Britain produces
only cloth. Some real shock causes the price of
wheat to rise tenpercentin bothcountries and the
price ofcloth to fall ten percent. Ifthe law ofone
price holds, then PPP holds and the exchange rate
should not change.
But consider what happens if one tests PPP
using equation 4 and GNP deflators. The GNP
deflator in the U.S. rises ten percent because it
contains only wheat. The GNP deflator for the
U.K. falls ten percent because it contains only
cloth. The exchange rate is constant, but the ratio
ofthe price indices rises. Because the indices do
nothave identicalweights, estimatesofequation4
can reject purchasing power parity even though
the theory holds exactly.
From an arbitrage perspective, different
weights introduce a form of measurement error
into relative price levels. As an example, suppose
the variance in the ratio of price indices, (T2,
comes from two independent sources: pure mone-
tary shocks for which PPP holds exactly, (Tit, and
movements in the ratio ofprice indices that come
from changes in relative prices with unequal
weights, (Tw.
(T2 = (Tit + (TW
Under these conditions, ordinary least squares
yields the following estimate for B:
Evidence
Most of the evidence concerning the arbitrage
version of purchasing power parity has come
either from estimating equations like 4 oranalyz-
ing the behaviorofreal exchange rates (which are
actual exchangerates dividedby the rates implied
by PPP). This section concentrates on regression
results. The behavior of real exchange rates is
covered in the section dealing with the evidence
for efficientcommodity markets. Foran extensive
review of the results of regression analysis, see
Officer (1976). Dornbusch (1985) provides a
briefer review that covers most of the relevant
research through 1984.
The general consensus on this empirical
research is that, while regression results may
provide some support for PPP during the 1920s,
they provide almost no support for the theory
during the 1970s.5 However, this conclusion is too
negative for two reasons. First, recent evidence
not available to Officer or Dornbusch supports
PPP. Second, in many cases, the rejection ofPPP
is based on a misinterpretation of the regression
results.
As an example of some of the evidence not
available to OfficerorDornbusch, MarkRush and
Steven Husted (1985) report long-run support for
PPP between the U.S. and several countries. For
other combinations ofcountries, their results are
mixed. In addition, Craig Hakkio (1984) com-
bines time series and cross section analysis, and
obtains results thatprovide strong supportfor PPP.
Although Tahmoures Parsai's (1982) research
indicates that other factors influence exchange
rates, his estimates of the relationship between
price levels and exchange rates also support PPP
and are not sensitive to the inclusion of other
variables. As PaulKrugman(l978) pointsout"...
one must be cautious in determining the extent of
and the reasons for failure of PPP to hold, for the
world has laid statistical traps for the unwary."
The following sections use the arbitrage
approach to PPP to examine why PPP might
appear to fail and to show how these apparent
failures can be statistical traps. They also review
the evidence concerning the relative importance
ofthe various sources for failure. The last section
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(5)importance ofmonetary shocks and measurement
error.
For a number of years, the Federal Statistical
Office ofGermany has used identical bundles of
goods to calculateabsolute purchasing powerpar-
ities for severalcountries.6 JohnMussachia(1984)
compares the results oftesting PPP with this data
and conventional price indices. The results sug-
gest that, except perhaps for very stable relative
price levels, different weights are not a major
sourcefor the observederrors inpurchasingpower
parity.
SimUltaneity
Even ifpurchasing power parity held exactly and
there were no problems with price indices, tests of
equation4 still couldyield a low R2 and estimates of
13 close to zero. Under the arbitrage version ofPPP,
neither price levels nor exchange rates are
exogenous variables. As a result, there is the pos-
sibilityofbias due to simultaneousequations. Krug-
man (1978) provides a simple example of simul-
taneous equations bias in PPP. In his model, the
central bank attempts to stabilize the exchange rate
by expanding the domestic money supply as the
domestic price of foreign exchange falls. This sta-
bilization policy biases the estimate of B toward
zero because it causes the error term in equation4 to
be correlated with the ratio ofprice levels, violating
one of the assumptions of ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression.
Two stage least squares (2SLS) is the standard
way to deal with this problem. The first stage of
2SLS develops a proxy variable. Ifthis variable is a
good proxy for the original explanatory variable,
e.g., pH/pF, and it is also independent of the error
term in the original regression, then substituting the
proxy for the original explanatory variable in the
second stage regression eliminates the correlation
with the error term and eliminates the bias.
Although OLS estimates ofequation4are subject
to bias due to simultaneous equations, this bias does
not appear to be a major reason that regressions
often fail to support PPP. Measurement error due to
unequal weights and some of the other sources for
errors in PPP described below also introduce bias
and cause the error term in equation 4 to be corre-
lated with the ratio of price levels. These other
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sources for bias appear to be more important for two
reasons. If the conventional arbitrage version of
PPP were correct and simultaneous equations bias
per se were the problem with the regressions, then
thereal exchange rate would not behave as though it
were very closeto arandom walk. In addition, when
the test equation for PPP is reformulated so as to
reduce the bias from these other sources, two stage
andordinary leastsquares yield essentially the same
results.?
Information and Transaction Costs
Tradables. In discussions ofPPP, it is customary
to divide goods into two categories: tradables, for
which information and transaction costs as well as
other impediments are zero, and nontradables, for
which these impediments effectively prevent trade.
The assumption of no impediments for tradables is
analytically convenient, but not very accurate.
Transaction costs and tariffs introduce errors into
the law of one price even for widely traded goods
such as wheat and oil. Although these impediments
can introduce errors into PPP, the errors are
bounded. Once the pound price ofwheat converted
into dollars at the going exchange rate exceeds the
dollar price ofwheat by the cost ofshipping wheat
plus any tariff, arbitrage presumably prevents the
next shockfrom widening that gap. (See Aizenman,
1984a and 1984b, for a detailed discussion of how
transaction costs introduce errors into PPP and how
these errors can bias the estimate ofB toward zero.)
As a result, ifthe errors in PPP were primarily the
result of the effects of information and transaction
costs for tradables, then real exchange rates should
not behave like random walks.
Work by Richard Roll (1979), Michael Darby
(1980), John Pippenger (1982), and Michael Adler
and Bruce Lehman (1983) indicates that real
exchange rates behave randomly, which implies that
the predictive error in PPP is unbounded. Although
some new evidence presented below indicates that
the errors are bounded, the boundaries appear to be
very wide and/or very weak. The behavior of real
exchange rates, therefore, suggests that the errors in
purchasing power parity are not primarily due to the
effects oftrade impediments on tradables.
Dynamics. Purchasing power parity is usually
viewed as primarily a theory of the long-run deter-mination ofexchange rates. Actual and parity rates
candiverge in the short-run, butin the long-run they
tend to converge.8 Almost every asset model ofthe
exchange rate implies this kind ofbehavior. Indeed,
many asset models assume PPP fails completely in
the short-run but holds exacty in the long-run.
A dynamic interpretation of PPP implies that
equation 4 is misspecified. In a dynamic frame-
work, the current exchange rate depends on both
current and lagged relative price levels and, per-
haps, lagged exchange rates. See Hodgson and
Phelps (1975) for an attempt to estimate a dynamic
version ofequation 4.
Ifmarket forces tend to bring actual and parity
rates into equality in the long-run, then changes in
the deviation from PPP must be correlated. Suppose
the actual rate is above the rate implied by PPP. If
the error is random, then that gap is as likely to
increase as decrease. Any move above parity is as
likely to be followed by a further move away from as
a move toward parity, and the changes in the error
are uncorrrelated. But if there are market forces at
work bringing actual and parity rates together, then
the gap is more likely to decrease than increase.
Beyond some point, any move above parity even-
tually is followed bya movementbacktoward parity,
and there is negative serial correlation in the
changes in the error. Since, as mentioned earlier, the
predictive errors for PPP behave almost like random
walks, a dynamic version of equation 4 does not
appear to be appropriate.
The evidence concerning the behavior of real
exchange rates raises serious questions about the
view that purchasing power parity is essentially a
long-run theory. Although there is evidence that real
rates do not behave exactly like random walks, the
deviation from arandom walk is so slightthatitdoes
not indicate any strong tendency for actual and
parity rates to converge in the long-run. Opponents
of PPP will be tempted to interpret this pattern as
evidence that the theory does not hold much better
in the long-run than in the short-run. However, the
efficient commodity market model of purchasing
power parity discussed below suggests a different
interpretation. From that perspective, the observed
behavior ofreal exchange rates suggests that com-
modity markets influenceexchange rates in boththe
long-run and short-run.
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Nontradables. As mentioned earlier in discuss-
ing PPP, it is convenient to divide goods into two
groups: tradables with no impediments and nontrad-
abIes where transaction costs or trade restrictions
effectively prohibit trade. For tradables, the law of
oneprice holds and so does equation 3 as longas the
bundle contains only tradables. When price indices
contain nontradables, real shocks can cause PPP to
fail.
Take concrete as an example of a nontradable.
Suppose some shock raises the price ofconcrete in
the U.S. and lowers the price of concrete in the
U.K., but all other prices in both countries are
unchanged. With no change in the prices oftraded
goods, the exchange rate is unchanged. But a price
index including concrete rises in the U.S. and falls
in the U.K. Purchasing power parity fails because
the change in relative prices between tradables and
nontradables is different in the two countries.
Thedistinction betweenthe structureofthe errors
for tradables and nontradables is important. Ifthe
errors in PPP are due primarily to shocks that affect
tradables, then the errors are bounded. Ifthe errors
are due primarily to changes in relative prices for
nontradables, no such restriction applies. A given
shock might raise the relative price of concrete in
the U.S., butthe next shockmighteitheraccentuate
or offset the effect ofthe first shock.9
From an arbitrage perspective, changes in capital
flows, tastes or technology can introduce large
persistent errors into PPP bycausing relative prices
between tradables and nontradables to change dif-
ferently in different countries. This interpretation of
the effects ofsuch shocks helps explain why it is so
difficult to find any empirical regularity between a
given type of shock and the error in PPP. Under
some circumstances a larger capital flow might
cause the relative price of concrete to rise in a
country; under others, the relative price might fall.
Changes in relative prices for nontradables not
only introduce errors into PPP, they also bias the
estimate of B toward zero. Suppose the variance in
the ratio of price indices is 0'2 and part of this
variance comes from purely monetary shocks, O'*",
for which PPP holds perfectly. In addition, there is
another element, O'~, that comes from real shocks.
Ifthese different sourcesfor the variance intheratio
ofprice indices are uncorrelated, then 0'2equals O'*"plus CTR., and a variation ofequation 5' describes the
estimate ofB. 10
Asinflationary shocks dominate real shocks, the R2
and estimate of B approach unity. As monetary
shocksdisappear, the R2andestimateofB approach
zero even though PPP holds perfectly for monetary
shocks and real shocks have not increased. In other
words, underthese conditions, regression results do
notdependonjustthe effectivenessofarbitrage and
PPP, they also depend on the degree of monetary
coordination in the two countries. Onthe one hand,
the real shocks can be relatively large, but if the
differences in the rates of inflation are also very
large, then the R2 and B are close to unity. On the
other hand, even if the errors in PPP due to real
shocks are very small, a sufficient degree ofmone-
tary coordination can make the ratio CTR./CTtt such
that the R2 and B are not statistically different from
zero. As a result, PPP can appear to fail when the
errors are relatively small, and to succeed even
though the errors are relatively large.
Since the behavior ofreal exchange rates is very
close to a random walk, from an arbitrage perspec-
tive, the errors in purchasing power parity appear to
be dominated by changes in relative prices for
nontradables. Some shock raises the relative price
ofhaircuts orconcrete in the United States, but not
inGreatBritain.Ifthepriceoftradedgoods remains
constant, the U.S. price level rises relative to the
price level in the U.K., but the exchange rate does
not change. Ifthe next shock is as likelytoreinforce
as reverse the first, thenthe errorsin PPPbehave like
a random walk.
This interpretation ofthe error structure must be
taken as tentative for several reasons. First, direct
tests of the effectiveness of arbitrage for traded
goods suggestthat the law ofonepricedoes nothold
as a reasonable approximation even for traded
goods. See, for example, Peter Isard (1977) and 1.
David Richardson (1978). These results, however,
are suspect because they are based on subcategories
such as leatherproducts in price indices in different
countries that do not refer to identical, oreven very





wholesale, they tend to reflect posted prices rather
than the actual prices at which trade takes place.
When market prices for individual products such as
Malaysian rubber are used, the results provide more
support for arbitrage. See, for example, Liliane
Crouhy-Veyrac, Michel Crouhy and Jacques Melitz
(1980) and Aris Protopapadakis and Hans Stoll
(1984).
Another problem with this interpretation of the
errors is thatalmosteverything is tradable. Concrete
is traded internationally and tourists get haircuts. If
almost everything is tradable, but the boundaries
generated by impediments are very wide and not
very rigid for many commodities, then the bound-
aries for real exchangerates couldbe quite wide and
not very rigid. In that case, real exchange rates
would behave like a random walk with wide and
flexible boundaries, which is consistent with evi-
dence discussed later. Errors ofthis type would not
eliminate the kind ofbias described in equation 5';
they would just make the problem more complex.
Theefficientcommodity marketmodeldiscussed
below provides still another possible interpretation
of the observed errors in PPP. In that context,
efficient international speculation in commodities
in the absence oftrade generates a random walk in
real exchange rates.
Examples
Paul De Grauwe, Marc Janssens and Hilde
Leliaert (1982), De Grauwe and Marc Rosiers
(1984) and Davutyan and Pippenger (1985) show
that the predictive errors for PPP tend to be rela-
tively large when there are large differences in the
rates ofinflation. If, as seems likely, these errors are
the result of changes in the relative prices for non-
tradables, then regression estimates of equation 4
will give the best results when, in terms of the
predictive error, PPP works the worst. The reason is
that, even though monetary instability tends to
increase CTR., it also makes CTR.ICTtt very small. 11
The dependence of regression results on the
degree ofmonetary coordination not only leads to a
misinterpretation of the evidence, it also invites
specification search. Advocates of PPP can find
episodes where regressions appear to support the
theory, and those who oppose it can find situations
in which the same regressions appear to reject PPP.Estimates ofequation 4 for the United States and
Canadaduring the 1970s and early 1980s in the first
halfofTable 1providean exampleofthe importance
of relative monetary stability, and illustrate how
specification search can influence regression
results. An examination ofthe regression errors for
Francefrom the 1920s and 1970s illustrates whyitis
incorrect to conclude that PPP worked during the
1920s but failed during the 1970s.
The first half of Table 1 shows estimates of
equation 4 using monthly datafrom January 1972to
December 1977, and January 1978 to February
1984. During the first period, price levels in the two
countries moved together very closely. Wholesale
prices in Canada rose only five percent more than in
the United States. Forthat period, both ~ and theR2
are effectively zero. During the later period, the
Canadian price level rose 15 percent more than the
price level in the United States. For that period, the
R2 is respectable and the estimate of ~ is not
statistically different from unity. Using the usual
criteria ofR2 and ~, anyone wishing to reject PPP
could use the earlier period and anyone wishing to
support PPP could use the later period.
Although estimates for the earlier period appear
to reject PPP and estimates for the later period
support the theory, this interpretation of the evi-
dence is misleading. Although the R2 and ~ are
closer to unity for the later period, this is primarily
because there is more variability in both exchange
rates andrelativeprice levels during the laterperiod.
In other words, <TK-t is larger in the second period.
The fact that the standard errors are identical in the
two periods means that the amount of variation in
the exchange ratethatcannotbeexplainedbyPPPis
identical in the two cases, which indicates that <T~ is
the sameinbothperiods. PPPworkedjustas well in
the earlier period as in the later. The difference
between the two periods is primarily that <T~/<TK-t is
smaller in the second period because <TK-t is larger.
ThebottomhalfofTable 1shows Frenkel's results
for France in the 1920s and 1970s using two stage
least squares. Based on the estimates ofR2 and ~,
the results for the 1920s appear to support purchas-
ing power parity while those for the 1970s reject the
theory. The widespread belief that PPP worked in
the 1920s but failed in the 1970s is based on similar
results for a number ofcountries. 12
However, if one interprets the standard errors of
the regression as an index of the effects of real
shocks, the evidence does not support the conclu-
sion that purchasing power parity worked in the
1920s and failed in the 1970s. Indeed, those errors
suggest just the opposite. The standard error for
France in the 1920s is 0.054, but it falls to 0.029 in
the 1970s.13 The large R2 and ~ during the 1920s is
simply a reflection of the fact that a very large
proportionofthe variability in the exchange rate can
TABLE 1








Canada Jan. 1972 -0.02 0.25 0.03 1.07 0.82
Dec. 1977 (0.01) (0.16) 0.010
Jan. 1978 -0.15 0.82 0.37 1.62 0.73
Feb. 1984 (0.00) (0.12) 0.010
France Feb. 1921 1.183 1.091 n.a. 1.70 0.58
May 1925 (0.157) (0.109) 0.054
June 1973 -1.52 -0.18 n.a. 2.26 0.86
July 1979 (0.03) (0.37) 0.029
Sources: Canada, Davutyan and Pippenger (1985) Table 5. France, Frenkel (1981) Tables I and 2.
Note: Canadian estimates use SAS autoreg corrected for one period serial corrrelation. French estimates use two stage least squares.
Standard errors in parentheses. No base period.
37be explained by monetary shocks. In other words,
the R2 and estimates of B are close to one for the
1920s because ali is large, not because a~ is small.
Thefact thattheabsolute sizeofthe standarderroris
smallerduring the 1970s means that amount ofthe
variability in the exchange rate that cannot be
explainedbyPPPis smallerduring the 1970s. Since
there was muchmore monetary coordinationduring
the 1970s, this result indicates that the R2 and
estimate ofB for that period are low because ait is
low, not because the errors due to real shocks, a 2R'
are large. Ifpurchasing power parity was a success
in the 1920s, it did not collapse in the 1970s.
Thewidespread belief that PPP collapsed in the
lastdecadeis basedona seriousmisinterpretationof
the evidence that ignores the econometric traps
involved in estimating purchasing power parity.
II. Efficient Commodity Markets
(6)
A number of studies referred to earlier indicate
that real exchange rates behave like a random walk.
To explain these random walks, Roll (1979)
developed a theory based on speculation inefficient
international commodity markets. Roll's theory
expands the traditional view of purchasing power
parity in two ways. It uses speculation rather than
arbitrage and stresses intertemporal transactions.
Since most international trade involves time and
some element of speculation, this approach is a
significant advance in terms of realism over the
traditional arbitrage approach to purchasing power
parity. 14
Under the arbitrage approach, a trader buys a
good this month at home and sells it this month in
another country. Since the presence ofrisk is never
mentioned in such an analysis, there is an implicit
assumption that all prices are known with certainty.
In Roll's model, there is no physical transfer of
commodities. Instead, speculators in one country
speculateonchanges in exchangerates and changes
in commodity prices in the other country.
Intertemporal SpeCUlation without Trade
As an example of Roll's approach, consider a
speculator who buys a commodity in a foreign
country in month t- 1for sale in that country the next
month t. Ifp(F,t-l) is the cost of the good in the
foreign countrty in t-l and S(t-1) is the domestic
price of foreign exchange that month, then the
domestic price ofthe foreign good int-l is S(t-
l)p(F,t-l). The return from the sale of the com-
modity is S(t)p(F,t), where S(t) is the exchange rate
int and p(F,t) is the pricethe speculatorreceives for
the goodin the foreign country. Sincethe natural log
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of the return over the cost is approximately the
percentage difference between the two, the gross
rate ofreturn from this transaction is
1 [ S(t)p(F,t) J
n S(t-1)p(F,t-l)
Whether or not the speculator engages in such a
transaction depends on the net return, which is the
difference between the return from foreign specula-
tion and a similardomestic transaction. Letp(H,t-
1) be the domestic price of the good in t- 1 and
p(H,t) the price in t. Under these conditions, equa-
tion 7 describes the net return rs from intertemporal
international speculation.
r = Inr S(t)p(F,t) 1- In [ P(H,t)]
s L S(t-1)p(F,t-l).J p(H,t-l)
= In [S(t)p(F,t)l - In [S(t-l)P(F,t-l)] (7)
p(H,t) J p(H,t-l)
If international commodity speculation is effi-
cient, then, based on the information available in
period t-l, the expected net return should be
zero. 15
(8)
where E is the expectations operator and 1) is
the information available in t-l.
Equations 7 and 8 imply equation 9, where Ut
is an uncorrelated random variable with zero mean.Intertemporal SpeCUlation with Trade
Without trade, speculators can only guess
whether an expected change in a price at home
p(H,t)/p(H,t-l) will equal the domestic value of
the change in the price ofthe same goodinaforeign
country - S(t)p(F,t)/S(t-1)p(F,t-I). In this type
of speculation, the level of the exchange rate is
irrelevant. Halving or doubling S(t) and S(t-I)
does not alter S(t)p(F,t)/S(t-l)P(F,t-I). When
speculationinvolves trade, the returnsdependonthe
level ofexchange rates. Ifthepriceofpoundsterling
rises withno changein the product pricein the U.S.
or U.K., itbecomes relatively more profitable to
buy in the U.S. "tllis" period for sale in the U.K. in
the "next"period.
Consider an exporter who buys a good at home
this period, ships it, and sells it abroad next period.
Inthe tenninologyofefficientmarkets, equation 9
means all the infonnation relevant fordetennining
the real exchange rate next period is already fully
reflected in the current real exchange rate.
Consider the following implication of equation
9. Suppose the price of wheat in Canada this
month times the current priceofthe Canadiandollar
does not equal the current price of wheat in the
United States. According to equation 9, that dif-
ference is as likely to increase as to decrease in the
next month. Given efficient international specula-
tion withouttrade, marketforces donot work toward
restoring the law ofone price. Since this is true for
every commodity, it holds for arbitrary bundles of
commodities. 16 As a result, there are no market
forces at workrestoring long-run equality between
actual exchange rates and the rates implied by
purchasing power parity. Real exchange rates per-
fonn a random walkbecause, no matterwhatthegap
between the actual and parity rate is in one period,
the gap is as likely to grow as to shrink in the next
period. 17
Using the earliernotation,• the gross returnfrom this
transaction is In- ([S(t)p(F,t)]/p(H,t-I)}. The net
return, which is the incentive for such activity,
depends on the return from similar domestic trans-
actionS. lfthespeclliatorbuysthegoodathollleolle
month and sells it at homenext month, the return is
In[p(H,t)/p(H,t-I)]. The net return from specula-





- In [... P(H,t)].
p(H,t-l)
- I •••[ •. S(t)p(F,t)
rt - n.. p(H,t-1)
= In .[S(t)P(F,t)]
p(H,t)
Equations 10 and II imply the conventional law
of one price with an error tenn that reflects the
uncertainty about future prices.
In[p(H,t)] = In [S(t)p(F,t)] + et (12)
where et is an uncorrelated random variable with
zero mean.
Although the argument has been developed in
tennsof a single commodity, exactly the same
reasoning applies to any arbitrary bundle ofcom-
modities. In an efficient market without transaction
costs,theexpectedreturn from buyinganybundleat
home this period and selling it abroad next period
cannot exceed the expected return from buying at
hOme and selling at home. 18 Efficient commodity
markets with trade imply the absolute version of
purchasing power parity with an error tenn.
The net return is the percentage error in the law of
oneprice. IfS(t)p(F,t)/p(H,t) is unity, the law ofone
price holds and the return from additional intertem-
poral international trade is zero.
The arbitrage version of the law of one price is
based on international trade at known prices within
a given time period where, ignoring transaction
costs, arbitrage eliminates any net return. An effi-
cient market version involves intertemporaltrade
withexpected prices where theexpectednetreturnis





39whereP(H,t) and P(F,t) are the home and foreign
price of an identical bundle of goods, and 'YI is an
uncorrelated random variable with zero mean.
Since the discussion has ignored the transaction
costs associated with trade, the source of the error
term 'Y in equation 13 is the same as the source for
the error u in equation 9. They both come from
imperfect information. In equation 9, imperfect
information generates a random walk in real
exchange rates because expected returns depend on
expected changes in prices and exchange rates.
With trade, expected returns depend on the level of
prices and exchange rates, and so deviations ofthe
actual rate from the rate implied by parity are
uncorrelated. If they were correlated, expected net
returns from trade would not be zero and trade in
international commodity markets would not be effi-
cient.
Recognizing the information and transaction
costs associated with trade provides a link between
the arbitrage version ofPPPand the efficientmarket
interpretation with trade. In the conventional
arbitrage version of PPP, these costs introduce
errors that are larger in the short-run than in the
long-run. An efficient market interpretation of PPP
with trade essentially adds an errorterm like 'Y to the
arbitrage version. 19 Equation 14 describes the rela-
tive version of an efficient market interpretation of
PPP with trade and transactions costs.
[
P(H,t)] In[S(t)] = In P(F,t) + 'YI
[
S(t+ 1)] _ ( PH) In ~ - In pF + VI + gl
(13)
(14)
run, deviations ofthe actual rate from parity are not
only bounded, they also tend to disappear in the
long-run.
To see the relation between an efficient market
interpretationofPPP with trade and Roll's inter-
pretation without trade, consider the following
example. Suppose Roll's speculation in wheat
between the U.S. and Canada generates a random
walk for the•real·wheat·exchange rate between the
two countries. If$/$C is the U.S. price of the
Canadiandollar, W is wheat in the U.S. and WC is
wheat in Canada, then speculation without trade
causes ($/$C)/[($/W)/($C!WC)] to perform a ran-
dom walk. As a result, in the absence ofany other
influences, the real wheat exchange rate will drift
off toward plus or minus infinity in time.
But long before that happens, trade takes place.
Suppose this morning the price of wheat in Win-
nipeg converted to U.S. dollars is less than the price
expected next week in Chicago. If the price dif-
ference exceeds the transportation costs, there is an
incentive to buy wheat in Winnipeg, load it on a
train andship itto Chicago for sale next week. From
that point on, real exchange rates no longer behave
like a random walk. Any further downward move-
ment in the real wheat exchange rate is resisted by
wheat moving from Canada to the United States.
The shipments of wheat put upward pressure on
Canadian wheat prices, downward pressure on
wheat prices in United States, and increase the
demand for Canadian dollars. Since the same argu-
ment holds for every commodity, efficient interna-
tional commodity markets with trade imply that
changes in real exchange rates should show evi-
dence of negative serial correlation and should not
be random walks.
where both v and g are error terms with negative
serial correlation.20 The term g has negative serial
correlation because it represents the temporary
deviations of the actual rate from parity generated
by imperfectinformation.21 The term vhas negative
serial correlation because it is due to transaction
costs that allow only limited deviations between
actual exchange rates and those implied by PPP.
This negative serial correlation is reinforced when
these costs are effectively zero in the long-run. In
the case where transaction costs are zero in the long-
40
Evidence
Roll(1979), Darby (1980) and Mussachia (1984)
analyzemonthly real exchange rates for many coun-
triesduring the 1970s while Pippenger (1982) and
Adler and Lehman(1983) use annual data over long
periods.22 The tests include regressions, autocor-
relations and spectral analysis, and in eachcase real
exchangerates appearto behave as though they were
random walks. Although a random walk is consis-
tent withefficientinternational commodity marketswithout trade, trade should impose boundaries on
real exchange rates. The evidence presented next
suggests that such boundaries exist.
These tests combine autocorrelation and spectral
analysis with atechnique usedby Roll (l979). Roll
tests his model by calculating the means ofregres-
sion coefficients for many pairs of countries. The
advantage of this approach is that it can reveal
patternsthataresoweakthattheyarenotobservable
for any given pair. A regression coefficientmightbe
statistically insignificant for 20 different.pairs of
countries, butifitis positivefor all ofthemthen itis
almost certainly positive. Unfortunately, Roll's
regressions were not designed to test for the pres-
ence of the kind of barriers that exist with trade.
Sinceautocorrelation and spectral analysis are natu-
ral ways to test for such barriers, Tables 2 and 3




arbitrage view of PPP and efficient markets with
trade is that·real exchange rates are bounded by
"reflecting barriers" and changes in real exchange
rates have negative serial correlation. Although Roll
(1979), Darby (1980) andMussachia(1984) all find
no evidence of negative serial correlation for
monthly data in the 1970s, combining the results
from several countries suggests that reflecting bar-
riers do exist.
The technique is simple: obtain the autocorrela-
tionestimates for 13 lags for 24reaLexchangera.tes
using wholesale indices and end-of-month
exchangerates from the InternationalFinancial Sta-
tistics tape for 1976.7 to 1983.12.23 Compute the
average autocorrelation estimate at each Jagllsing
the 24 pairs ofcountries and, in addition, takethe
mean ofthese.averages. The reason for computing
the mean ofthe averages at the various Jagsisthat
reflecting barriers are probably not identicalforthe
various countries; their differences would lead to
different lag structures. Ifthe series are true random
walks, there should be no evidence ofeither nega-
tive or positive correlation. If there are reflecting
barriers, then there should be some evidence of
negative serial correlation.
Table 2 shows the average autocorrelation esti-
mates. For these countries the real exchange rate is
notarandomwalk. Five ofthe lags are significantat
the one percentlevel,24 but there is no clearpattern
of negative serial correlation because two of these
estimates are positive. The mean ofthe 13 autocor-
relation estimates, however, is negative and signifi-
cant at the ten percent level. The average autocor-
















































*Significant at ten percent level, single-tailed.
**Significant at five percent level, single-tailed.
***Significant at one percent level, single-tailed.
41they provide only weak support for the existence of
reflecting barriers. Spectral analysis yields stronger
results.
SpectralA....alysis
One natural interpretation of the concept of the
short-run is that it refers to short cycles. A similar
relationshipbetween cycle len?thand the length of
the run holds forthe intermediate and long-run. For
income andemployment, the short-run might refer
to cycles of up to twoyears and thelong-run to
cycleslongerthan·the business cycle. Inthecontext
of·highly organized markets such as the foreign
exchange market, the short-run is more likely to
refer to a period of a few days ora few months at
most. Cycles as long as a couple of years almost
certainly would couespondtothe long-run, and the
concept of the intermediate-run would apply to
cycles from a few months up to perhaps a year.
Given this association between the length ofthe run
and the length ofcycles, spectral analysis allows us
to see how much ofthe variance in a variable, such
as the changeintherealexchangerates, comesfrom
the short-run, intermediate-run, and long-run.25 If
changes in real exchange rates are uncorrelated, as
impliyd by .a random walk, then the short-run,
intermediate-runand long-run allcontributeequally
to the variance. In Figure 1, which shows average
estimates for spectral density, that implication of a
randomwaikisshownbythesolidhorizontal at
1hT or 0.318.26
Ifthere are.barriers that restrict long-run move-
ments in real exchange rates, they would reduce the
lon.g-runcomponent ofthe variance for changes in
real exchange rates. As an example,.suppose the
traditional dynamic viewof.f>PP.is cQITect. In the
short-run, a variety ofshocks drive actual rates away
from PPP, but inthe long-run, market forces bring
actual and parity rates back into equality. In that
case, there are short-run changes in the real
exchange rate, but no long-run changes because in
the long-run the real exchange rate is constant at
1.0. Inotherwords, noneofthe variance in changes
in real exchange rates comes from the long-run. A
dynamic interpretationofPPPimplies thatthe spec-
tral density estimates inthe figure are above 111r for
short cycles and below 1hT at long cycles.
Pippenger (1982) shows that spectral density
estimates for annual changes in real exchange rates
are essentially constant regardless of the length of
TABLE 3





























































*Significant at ten percent level, single-tailed.
**Significant at five percent level, single-tailed.
***Significant at one percent level, single-tailed.
42be significantly different from IhT. If there were
reflecting barriers, the estimates should be above 11
1T at the shorter cycles and below 1I1T for long
cycles.
Th¢pattemforthe spectralestimates in th¢figure
allows one to reject the idea that the real exchange
rate performs a random walk. Instead, it supports a
dynamic interpretation ofPPP. There. isa clear
tendency for the estimates to lie below l/1Tfor the
longestcycles. Table 3 shows that,althoughthe
estimateatthe shortestcycle is below1/1T (although
notsignificantly so ateven thetenpercentlevel), the
next six estimates all are above 1I1T. At the seven
longestcycles, all estimates are below IhT with two
significant at the ten percent level, one at the five
percentlevel, and two estimates significantly below
1I1T at the one percentlevel. Forthese countries as a
group and for this time period, real exchange rates
do not behave as a random walk. The spectral
density estimates strongly support the existence of
elastic reflecting barriers that restrain long-run
movements in real exchange rates. These barriers
may be quite wide and very elastic, but they do
appear to exist. The pattern shown in the figure and
Table 3 does not refute Roll's basic idea ofefficient
international commodity markets, it simply indi-
cates that, beyond some point, trade limits the















the cycle. Since Mussachia (1984) obtains similar
results for monthly data during the 1970s, an
approach like the one used for autocorrelations is
applied to the spectral estimates. That is, the esti-
mate for the two-month cycle is the mean of the
spectral density estimates for the twenty-four real
exchange rates in that cycle.
The broken line in the figure shows the average
special density estimates for the countries used
earlier. These estimates and their deviation from
117r are given in Table 3. Ifthere were no reflecting
barriers and real exchange rates perform a random
walk, then the spectral density estimates should not
3.18 1-----4:.........::::~:......~r_
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m. Accept or Reject?
In most people's mind, the decision to accept or
reject a theory involves two closely related, but
different, issues. The first is whether the theory is
the best available and the second is whether it is
accurate. There is a good deal of support for the
arbitrage and efficient market interpretations of
purchasing power parity. After allowing for the
economic and econometric effects of information
and transaction costs, the evidence supports the
basic implication ofpurchasing powerparity- that
substantial and prolonged changes in relative price
levels are associated with roughly proportional
changes in exchange rates.
Even more important, no theory can explain
eitherthe level orchangeinexchangerates overtime
and across space as well as purchasing power parity.
The only serious contender is the asset approach to
exchange rates and, at this time, that approach has
failed. 27 There is no choice. In the strict sense, we
must accept purchasing power parity because it
yields the best predictions.
Most of the objections to PPP are related to the
accuracy ofthetheory. Evenifitis thebestavailable,
many people are unwilling to accept a theory unless
itachieves someminimallevelofaccuracy. Perfonn-
ing only slightly better than demon chance is not
good enough. The problem with this aspect of
acceptance is that it is almost entirely subjective. Is
the glass half full or half empty? Is an error often
percent large or small?
Table 4 illustrates the problem. It shows the
"real" German mark price of the United States
dollar, French franc, British pound and Canadian
dollar from 1975 to 1985 using identical bundles.28
43At.one extreme, from 1975 to 1985, the actual mark
priceoftheFrenchfranc roseonly four ~rcent more
thanimpliedby PPP. Atthe other, the mark price of
United States' dollars rose 56 percent more than
implied.by.PPP.29 For• tl1esecountries •.on average,
the actual rate rose 28 ~rcent more.than predicted
by PPP. Relative PPP as an explanation ofexchange
rates certainly is not impressive for this time period
andthese countries.
The errorsforabsolute PPP inTable 4 range from
al1linlls22percentforGreatBritainin January 1977
to 59 percentfor the U.S.•inJanuary 1985. Th.at is,
in January 1985, the actual mark price ofthe dollar
was 59 percent higher than predicted by purchasing
power parity based on the bundle ofgoods used by
the German Federal Statistical Office. Although
individual errors are quite large, the average error
for each of the four countries over the 10 years is
much smaller. They range from - 2 percent for
France to 10 percent for Canada. The average error
for all the countries combined over the 10 years is
only 2 percent. Deviations from absolute PPP can
be very large, but, on average, the theory is
amazingly accurate.30
Whether or not the occasionally large errors jus-
tifyrejecting purchasing power parity,.ortl1e small
average error warrants acceptance, is up to each
individualtodecide. The way one uses PPP willplay
an important role in that decision. For policy-
makers, the potential for large errors means poten-
tially serious mistakes when policy is based pri-
marily on PPP. For scientific purposes, the
occasionally large errors are challenges for future
research rather than potential disasters.
TABLE 4
Real German Exchange Rates Using Identical Bundles
country Pairs
Period OM/US OM/FF OM/UK OM/CAN AVERAGE
Relative
Jan 1975
to 0.56 0.04 0.19 0.35 0.28
Jan 1985
Absolute
Jan 1975 0.92 0.93 0.70 1.00 0.89
Jan 1976 1.02 1.05 0.88 l.15 1.03
Jan 1977 0.97 0.92 0.78 1.08 0.94
Jan 1978 0.88 0.89 0.82 0.91 0.88
Jan 1979 0.81 0.94 0.79 0.79 0.83
Jan 1980 0.81 0.99 0.94 0.79 0.88
Jan 1981 1.02 1.06 1.28 0.99 1.09
Jan 1982 1.11 1.03 1.15 1.13 1.11
Jan 1983 1.19 0.98 1.00 1.21 1.09
Jan 1984 1.40 0.96 1.08 1.41 1.21
Jan 1985 1.59 1.01 1.01 1.52 1.28
Average 1.06 0.98 0.95 1.10 1.02
Data: Absolute PPP, Gennan Federal Statyistical Office. Actual exchange rates, end of month from IFS tape.
44IV. Summary
The evidence supporting the arbitrage version.of
purchasing power parityisstrongerthan generally
realized. Rejection of the theory often rests on a
misinterpretation ofthe<evideIlce. RegressioIls can
yield low coefficients and R2s even though the
predictive errors arerelatively small. In addition, in
the absence ofrapidinflation, the average predictive
errorfor absolute PPPappears to be quite small.
Those who insist on a high degree of accuracy
might reject the. theory because individual predic-
tive errors are sometimes very large. In terms of
relative predictivepower, however, one mustchoose
between the arbitrage and efficient commodity mar-
kets versions ofPPP. Overtime and space, no other
theory aboutexchange rates is as consistent with the
evidence. The only other serious contender, the
asset approach, has failed so far.
Accepting either an arbitrage or efficient market
version ofpurchasing power parity implies nothing
about the direction ofcausation. In addition, accep-
tance is not an assertion that otherinfluences are not
important. The exceptionally strong dollar in the
1980s suggests that other factors are indeed impor-
tant. One of the advantages of the arbitrage
approach is that it provides a way ofthinking about
how real shocks, such as changes in capital flows or
technology, drive actual rates away from the rates
implied by PPP.
Whether an arbitrage or efficient markets
approach to purchasing power parity is the right
choice is less clear. Standard interpretations ofthe
45
arbitrage version implythat theerrors inPPPshould
be primarily short-run in nature. The evidence,
however, indicates that the predictive errors are
almost as large in the long-run as in the short-run.
The fact that the predictive error behaves in the
fashion of a random walk - with wide elastic
reflecting barriers - tends to favorthe•efficient
market interpretation. But Roll developed theeffi-
cient commodity market model in order to explain
random walks in exchange rates, so random
behaviordoes notconstitute a truetestofthe theory.
Until some new implications ofthe efficientcom-
modity market model are derived and tested, the
evidence appears to support both the arbitrage and
efficient market approaches.
The choice between the two models is important.
The arbitrage version is consistent with the attempt
to build asset models to explain the behavior of
exchange rates. Since the conventional arbitrage
versionofPPPis essentiallya theory aboutthe long-
run behavior of exchange rates, and the asset
approach concentrates on the short-run, there is no
inherent conflict between the two. The efficient
commodity markets model, however, implies that
commodity markets playa key role in the short-run
determination of exchange rates. This approach is
inconsistent with most existing asset models ofthe
exchange rate because they exclude any role for
efficient commodity markets in the short-run deter-
mination ofexchange rates.FOOTNOTES
1. For a more thorough review of the theory underlying
PPP,seeLawrence Officer(1976) and Rudiger Dornbusch
(1985).
2. Although the relative version of PPP in general requires
weaker assumptions than the absolute version, it does
involveatleastoneimportantassumptionthattheabsolute
formdoes notrequire. Relative PPP implicitly assumes that
the base period describes an equilibrium or normal situa-
tion.
3.AIthough equation 4 is the basic test equation, several
stl..ldiesinclude lags, e.g., John Hodgson and Patricia
Phelps (1975), or other explanatory variables, e.g.,
Richard Dino (1977).
4. In many cases, the left hand side of the equation is
simply In[S(t)J and a is an estimate of the log of the base
period exchange r<:ite. In that case, a nonzero estimate for
a does not reject PPP.
5. See in particular Jacob Frenkel (1981).
6. For a description of this data, see W. Kohlhammer
(1970).
7. See Nurhan Davutyan and John Pippenger (1984).
8. This dynamic view of PPP implicitlyassumes that trans-
action costs decline with the length of the run. The discus-
sion of the nature of costs by Armen Alchian (1959) sug-
gests a number of reasons for this decline.
9. Since the difference between tradables and nontrad-
abies is one of degree, not kind, this argument overstates
the case. The basic point, however, is valid. The structure
ofthe errorterms should besubstantiallydifferentdepend-
ing on whether it is related to tradables or nontradables.
10. Since real and monetary shocks can be, and appar-
ently are, correlated, the problem is more complex than in
this simple example.
11. The effects of transaction costs on tradables, which is
what Aizenman (1984a and b), De Grauwe, Janssens and
Leliaert (1982) and De Grauwe and Rosiers (1984) stress,
and different weights, reinforce the bias from changes in
relative prices for nontradables.
12. Although similar results holdfora numberofcountries,
they do not hold for all. Price levels in Canada and the
United States moved together very closely in both the
1920s and early 1970s, and estimates of R2 and (3 reject
PPP in both periods. In addition, estimates for inflationary
countries in the 1970s such as Israel, Argentina and Brazil
yield results that are similar to the results for France in the
1920s. See Davutyan and Pippenger (1985).
13. This result is not particular to France. The average
standard error for the regressions that Frenkel reports for
the 1920s is 0.102, but it falls to 0.029 for the 1970s.
14. See Alan Shapiro (1983) for a discussion of efficient
commodity markets and purchasing power parity.
15. If there is no risk premium and futures prices equal
expected prices, then a similar argument holds for a form
of international arbitrage without trade.
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16. Instead of the arbitrage approach to PPP used here,
Roll (1979, p. 142) uses a welfare approach. "When rela-
tive prices arenot assumed to be constant, the continu-
ously compoundedrate of inflation must be measured by
anotherlog pricechange, thatofthe priceindexrelevantto
the speculator'spurchasingpower."
17. Technically, the errorisamartingale. But because iUs
more widely recognized, the term random walk is used
throughout instead of the more accurate martingale.
18. With transaction costs, the expected net return would
have to at least cover those costs before goods would be
shippec;i.
19. vvheninternational trade invplves buying either at
home or abroad in t-1 for sale at home in t, there is no
international uncertainty and "{ disappears.
20. Since the errors are correlated with both sides of
equation 18, from an econometric perspective it would be
more accurate to write this equation as [1 n{[S(t+1)/
S(t)]/(pH/pF)} =vt+ gt.
21. More formally, g has first ordernegative serial correla-
tion because it is the first difference of an uncorrelated
random variable "{.
22. Roll's data cover more than the 1970s. They run from
1957 to 1976.
23. The countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Can-
ada, Germany, Italy, Israel, Japan, U.K., and U.S. To avoid
any undue weight on inflationary episodes, for Argentina,
Brazil, and Israel, only real rates with the U.S. are used. The
time period, number of lags and countries were selected
before the tests were conducted.
24. The t-tests are based on the observed standard
deviation, not the theoretical standard deviation which
would assume independence.
25. See Jenkins and Watts (1968) for a detailed discus-
sion of spectral analysis.
26. Spectral density is the normalized spectrum. It has the
same relation to the spectrum that autocorreiation has to
autocovariance. When frequency is measured in radians,
the observed frequencies run from 0 to 'IT. Since the
estimates of the spectral density must sum to unity, the
estimates mustequal 1/'ITtobe constant acrossfrequency.
27. See, for example, Graham Haccheand JohnTownend
(1983) and Waseem Khan and Thomas Willett (1984).
28. The series start in 1975because there is a break in the
German data in 1974.
29. Forthe U.S. dollar, relative PPP even getsthedirection
wrong. I(predicts a 21 percent fall in the mark valueofthe
dollarwhen the valueofthedollaractually rises 35 percent.
30. With rapid inflation, the average predictive errors are
much larger. See Davutyan and Pippenger (1985), Table
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